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With 7.8 million migrants living in the country in 2013, the UK 
has among the largest foreign-born populations in the EU, smaller 
than Germany’s but larger than that of France.1 Moreover, the UK’s 
migrant population has diversified greatly over the past decade. 
Within this context Indian and Chinese migrants – respectively 
the 1st and 11th most populous migrant groups in 2011 – are worth 
comparing. While Indian migration flows became significant after 
World War II, with India becoming part of the British Common-
wealth after its independence, the significant migration flows from 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are relatively recent. Differ-
ences also appear once we look at the policies in these countries of 
origin. While the Chinese state still controls its borders, determining 
both who gets in and who gets out, the Indian emigration policy is 
much more liberal. 
1.  Source: Eurostat.
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Migrants from the PRC and India to the UK have 
certain commonalities. In the UK, earlier migra-
tion waves from these two origin countries were 
characterised by the lower-class backgrounds of the 
migrants. In contrast, new migrants are increasingly 
highly-skilled.2 At origin, the current policies of 
India and the PRC also share common threads: they 
both see migration as being beneficial to the country, 
whether migrants return or maintain ties while 
remaining abroad. Neither country recognizes dual 
citizenship, yet both the PRC and India give special 
status to people of Chinese and Indian ancestry, 
respectively. One major difference regarding their 
diaspora policies is that the PRC has a greater 
number of connections with recent Chinese organi-
sations abroad following the current state definition 
of “Chineseness”. In this paper, we thus compare 
Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK, 
and the ways in which it is affected by destination 
and origin policies. 
Synthetic indexes were constructed for three dimen-
sions of integration: access to citizenship, education, 
and labour market integration. These dimensions are 
amongst the most researched (Jacobs 2013; Nebiler 
2013; Vink 2013) and allow one to see origin and 
destination effects. Depending on the integration 
indicator under consideration, one might conclude 
that one group has better integration than the other.
2. We focus here on 1st generation migrants from the PRC 
and India. Past research, however, frequently used self-de-
clared ethnicity, thus including 1st, 2nd and 3rd generations, 
the “twice migrants” from Africa (migrants of India to 
former British colonies in Africa and their descendants), 
migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan and Chinese eth-
nic minorities from South East Asia.
Table 1: INTERACT indexes of integration for 
the UK
Country 
of birth
Labour Market Education Access to 
citizenship
Index Gap index Index
Gap 
index Index
China 0.11 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.16
India 1.00 0.77 0.61 0.59 0.44
Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015).
Citizenship
Access to UK nationality as an indicator paints a 
pessimistic picture of the integration of Chinese and 
Indian migrants living in the UK. Indian migrants 
have better access to citizenship than Chinese 
migrants. However, the Indian share of British citi-
zens is not particularly high either. Migrants born in 
India more frequently hold British citizenship (35%) 
than migrants from the PRC (22%). This phenom-
enon can still be observed if we look at recent acqui-
sition of citizenship. The average number of citi-
zenships granted from 2004 to 2008 was 2,778 for 
migrants from China (including Hong Kong) and 
13,828 for migrants from India.
Education
Chinese migrants are especially well off considering 
their education levels. The gap between Indian and 
Chinese migrants can be explained by introducing 
the share of students among the inactive population 
as an indicator of educational integration. Indeed, 
former migration flows and current family migration 
are prevalent among Indian migrants, and therefore 
only 12.9% of inactive Indian migrants are studying, 
compared to 83.4% of inactive Chinese migrants and 
21.9% of inactive natives. However, if we look at the 
share of tertiary-educated, both Indian and Chinese 
migrants outperform the natives. Thus educational 
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performance seems to be driven by migrants’ selec-
tivity effects. 
Labour Market 
In contrast with the education index, in which 
Chinese migrants outperform migrants from India, 
Indian migrants are better integrated into the labour 
market than Chinese. This is due to the fact that 
Chinese migrants have a higher unemployment rate 
and are also mainly students. However, due to the 
policy targeting highly skilled migrants, Chinese 
and Indian migrants occupy high-ranking posi-
tions once they are hired: 52.7 % of Indian-born and 
46.4 % of Chinese-born migrants occupy an ISCO 
1-3 position,3 compared to 42.8 % of British-born 
individuals. 
Explanatory factors
Policy frameworks and their evolution – both at 
destination and origin – impact Indian and Chinese 
migrants’ opportunities to leave their country 
of origin, stay in the UK, and return back home. 
Current Indian migrants are coming to the UK for 
the purpose of family reunion, as highly skilled 
professionals or as students. The first two categories 
are mid- and long-term migration, whereas students 
have more opportunities to migrate back to India or 
elsewhere. At present Chinese migrants are mainly 
students and the majority do not stay in the UK. Up 
until the end of the 1990s, according to PRC state 
policies, they were supposed to return to China upon 
graduation. They are now encouraged to participate 
in the human development of the country from 
abroad, and to return to the PRC whenever they 
choose (Xiang 2003). 
3. For a detailed presentation of the ISCO classifications, 
see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/
isco08/, accessed on 06 October 2014.
If we look at the gap between Chinese and Indian 
migrants regarding their access to citizenship, these 
findings cannot be explained by different policies at 
origin. Neither country allows dual citizenship. One 
explanation might be that India once belonged to the 
British Empire, and before the UK’s 1981 Nationality 
Act people born in India were British subjects. This 
connection also led to important migration flows 
from India to the UK long before migration from the 
PRC became significant.4 The year of arrival alone 
may explain Chinese migrants’ low access to citizen-
ship; one condition of naturalization is a minimum 
5-year residence in the UK. Fifty-one percent of 
Chinese migrants and 21% of Indian migrants 
arrived between 2006 and 2011. This is the main 
reason why Indian migrants naturalize much more 
than Chinese. In addition, the PRC used to encourage 
its migrants to integrate into their country of desti-
nation and take its citizenship. However, since the 
1990s, in parallel with the opening of its borders, the 
PRC redefined “Chineseness” to include its migrants 
and their descendants in order to help them keep 
their ties with China (Nyíri 2001); this could explain 
their current lower naturalization rate. 
In parallel with destination and origin policies’ 
effects on migration flows, one major explanatory 
factor of Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration 
is thus their year of arrival and their length of stay 
in the UK. If we look at housing types, for instance, 
the year of arrival is essential data. The same applies 
when we look at migrants’ language skills. Although 
Indian migrants speak better English than Chinese 
migrants (regardless of their year of arrival), language 
difficulties may be an explanatory factor for the inte-
gration profile of previous waves of migration. The 
English skills of new migrants are much better than 
they once were. English is taught in Indian schools 
as one of the official languages of the Indian State. 
4. Previous ‘Chinese’ migration flows were actually from 
Hong Kong, not the PRC.
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In the PRC, English is taught both in high school 
and, since 1977, in Chinese universities (Liu and Du 
2014). In parallel, since 2010, student migrants have 
needed to prove that they have good English skills 
(close to the GCSE level) at destination (Cerna 2014, 
p. 17). These language skills may explain why Indian 
and Chinese students not only graduate from British 
universities but reach top-rank positions once they 
are employed.
Thus, origin and destination policies have both direct 
and indirect effects on Indian and Chinese migrants’ 
integration in the UK. In addition to their push and 
pull power over who comes and who stays, they 
influence migrant organisations in the UK differ-
ently. Indeed, from the 1970s on, the multi-cultural 
British policy towards ethnic minorities supported 
integration and interaction at the community rather 
than individual level. Civil society organisations are 
consequently major actors of migrant integration, 
according to the British state. The Chinese commu-
nity seems much more connected to the Chinese 
state than the Indian community does to its state. 
This might explain why the Chinese migrants who 
arrived in the UK after 1981 feel more Chinese 
than their predecessors. Older Chinese migrants, 
who arrived in the UK when the Chinese State still 
considered them traitors to the country, were pushed 
by the state to assimilate rather than return or main-
tain transnational ties. 
Conclusion
The positions of Chinese and Indian migrants in 
British society seem to be the consequence of the 
combination of the origin and destination coun-
tries’ policies. These policies not only affected who 
came to the UK and who stayed there in the past, 
but also affect who comes and leaves currently. At 
present, the countries of origin and destination are 
in a competition for talent. In a context of stricter 
immigration policies, the countries of origin, espe-
cially China, are thus relatively more attractive to 
migrants. Destination and origin policies can thus 
affect migrants’ opportunity structures differently 
over time and have a direct and indirect effect on 
their integration on the long run. 
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of receiving country governments.
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